世界银行-重新思考发展中国家的电力部门改革（英文）-2019.9-356页.pdf

Rethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing WorldVivien Foster and Anshul RanaConference EditionRethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing WorldRethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing WorldVivien Foster and Anshul RanaSUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE SERIESConference EditionThe text of this conference edition is a work in progress for the forthcoming book,Rethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing World,by Vivien Foster and Anshul Rana,doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1442-6.A PDF of the final book,once published,will be available at https:/openknowledge.worldbank.org/and http:/documents.worldbank.org/,and print copies can be ordered at .Please use the final version of the book for citation,reproduction and adaptation purposes.2019 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.orgSome rights reservedThis work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,interpreta-tions,and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank,its Board of Executive Directors,or the governments they represent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.The boundaries,colors,denominations,and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank,all of which are specifically reserved.Rights and PermissionsThis work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license(CC BY 3.0 IGO)http:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo.Under the Creative Commons Attribution license,you are free to copy,distribute,transmit,and adapt this work,including for commercial purposes,under the following conditions:AttributionPlease cite the work as follows:Foster,Vivien,and Anshul Rana.2020.Rethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing World.Washington,DC:World Bank.doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1442-6.License:Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.TranslationsIf you create a translation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation.The World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.AdaptationsIf you create an adaptation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank.Views and opinions expressed in the adapta-tion are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed by The World Bank.Third-party contentThe World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content con-tained within the work.The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties.The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.If you wish to re-use a component of the work,it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that re-use and to obtain permission from the copyright owner.Examples of components can include,but are not limited to,tables,figures,or images.All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.Cover design:Bill Pragluski,Critical Stages,LLC.vForeword.xvAcknowledgments.xviiAbout the Authors .xxiBackground Papers.xxiiiAbbreviations .xxviiOverview:Key Findings and Policy Implications.1Introduction.1Key Findings.3Policy Implications.23Conclusions.35Notes.36References.37Part One:Setting the StageChapter 1 What Do We Mean by Power Sector Reform?.41Motivation.41A brief history of power sector reform .44The 1990s power sector reform model.46A theory of change.50An uncertain future.53Notes.55References.55Chapter 2 How Far Did Power Sector Reform Spread in the Developing World?.57Key findings.58Conclusion.70Note.70References.70Contentsvi ContentsChapter 3 How Did Political Economy Affect the Uptake of Power Sector Reform?.71Introduction.72Key findings.78Looking Ahead.99Conclusion.100Annex 3A.Global Power Sector Reform Index.101Annex 3B.Chi-squared contingency tables .102Annex 3C.World Bank support for Power Sector Reform Observatory countries and states.104Notes.106References.106Part Two:Building Blocks of ReformChapter 4 What Has Been Done to Restructure Utilities and Improve Governance?.111Introduction.112Key findings.117Looking ahead.131Conclusion.135Annex 4A.Utility restructuring index,2015.136Annex 4B.Planning and procurement index,2015.136Annex 4C.Utility governance index,2015.137Annex 4D.Utility classification,2015.138Annex 4E.Utility restructuring index,2015.139Notes.140References.140Chapter 5 What Has the Private Sector Contributed?.143Introduction.143Key findings.145Conclusion.166Annex 5 A.Private sector participation index.167Annex 5 B.Private sector participation index,2015.168Notes.168References.169Chapter 6 Did Countries Establish Meaningful Power Sector Regulation?.171Introduction.172Key findings.174Looking ahead.198Conclusion.202Annex 6A.Formal(de jure)scores on the Regulatory Performance Index.203Annex 6B.Perceived scores on the Regulatory Performance Index.204Notes.205References.205Chapter 7 What Progress Has Been Made with Wholesale Power Markets?.207Introduction.208Key findings.208 Contents viiLooking ahead.229Conclusions.232Notes.233References.234Part Three:Gauging ImpactChapter 8 Did Power Sector Reforms Improve Efficiency and Cost Recovery?.241Introduction.242Key findings.245Conclusion.266Annex 8A.Major studies of cost recovery and financial viability in the power sector in developing countries.267Annex 8B.Coverage of quantitative cost recovery analysis undertaken for this chapter.269Annex 8C.Indicators of cost recovery and financial viability of power sectors and utilities in 17 case studies.270Annex 8D.Indicators of efficiency of utilities in 17 case studies.273Notes.275References.275Chapter 9 Did Power Sector Reform Deliver Better Sector Outcomes?.277Introduction.278Key findings.279Conclusions.308Annex 9A.Econometric analysis of power sector reform impacts based on large sample(88 countries).310Annex 9B.Results of econometric analysis of power sector reform impacts based on large sample(88 countries).311Annex 9C.Cross-sectional regression analysis on the impact of power sector reform based on small sample(17 economies).318Notes.324References.324Boxes1.1 The World Bank and three decades of power sector reforms.421.2 The Rethinking Power Sector Reform Observatory:An introduction.522.1 Defining the Power Sector Reform Index.583.1 Methodology for political economy stakeholder analysis.733.2 Importance of public communication strategy to support reforms.964.1 Selected power sector structures around the world.1146.1 Introducing the Regulatory Performance Index.1747.1 How big must a power system be to support a wholesale power market?.2138.1 Methodology used in cost recovery analysis.2439.1 The methodological challenges of inferring the impact of power sector reforms.280FiguresO.1 The 1990s model was based on an underlying theory of change.2O.2 The trajectory of power sector reform followed different paths across countries.6O.3 For some countries,the gap between reform announcement and implementation has been considerable.7viii ContentsO.4 The private sectors contribution to new generation capacity was steady across income groups but heavily skewed by generation technology.8O.5 The bulk of private investment in generation came from foreign sponsors.8O.6 Direct negotiation of IPPs remains widespread in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa .9O.7 Electricity spot prices have shown wide variation across developing country markets.10O.8 Certain aspects of corporate governance are strongly associated with improved efficiency performance for distribution utilities.13O.9 Private sector participation in distribution peaked in the late 1990s before declining.14O.10 Private sector participation is associated with much higher levels of cost recovery,while performance on efficiency is within the range observed for public utilities.15O.11 Significant divergence exists between regulation on paper and regulation in practice.17O.12 Regulatory tariff recommendations are not always respected in practice.18O.13 More countries made progress on efficiency than on cost recovery,19902015.19O.14 Progress on twenty-first century policy objectives for electrification and decarbonization,19902015,countries ranked in descending order of reform effort.351.1 1990s model sector reforms:Inferred simple theory of change .502.1 OECD countries score systematically higher on the Power Sector Reform Index.592.2 OECD countries are more likely to have adopted restructuring and liberalization reforms.592.3 The uptake of power sector reform measures has been slowing since 2005.602.4 A slowdown is evident across a wide range of different reform measures.612.5 Latin America and the Caribbean led the way on power sector reform with many other regions lagging behind.622.6 Reform uptake has been strongly associated with income group and scale of system.642.7 Some reform measures proved a lot more popular than others.652.8 Some types of reforms diffused more rapidly than others.652.9 Barely a dozen developing countries managed to implement the full 1990s reform package.662.10 Countries with high PSRI scores undertook reforms at differing speeds.672.11 Power sector reform was conceived as a coherent package of measures implemented according to a logical sequence.682.12 A significant percentage of countries adopted reforms in unorthodox ways.69B3.1.1 No strong relationship between income group and quality of governance .733.1 Power sector reform process:Announcement,implementation,delivery,and sustainability.743.2 The contrasting reform trajectories of a bold reformer,Ukraine,and an incremental one,Vietnam .753.3 Contrast between reforms announced and reforms delivered in observatory countries.763.4 Some countries experienced reversals of reform once implemented.763.5 Nested model of political influences in power sector reform .783.6 Dependency on foreign aid was substantial at the time of power sector reform.82B4.1.1 Vertically integrated utility.114B4.1.2 Single-buyer model .115B4.1.3 Wholesale-buyer model.1164.1 Plans must be mandatory in implementation and combined with transparent and competitive procurement.1184.2 Sector planning remains necessary and calls for adequate institutional capacity and sound processes .1184.3 Overview of utility governance performance indicators.120 Contents ix4.4 Private utilities implement more governance best practices but government-owned utilities improve governance if there is some private competition.1214.5 Private utilities far outpace their public counterparts when it comes to making decisions independently.1224.6 Boards in state-owned utilities are less accountable than their private counterparts,which must answer to various shareholders.1224.7 Public utilities have little independence when it comes to raising capital and tend to follow national rather than international accounting standards .1234.8 Public utilities have little freedom in making staffing decisions and have less transparency in hiring as compared to their private counterparts .1244.9 Both public and private utilities have adopted the latest information and technology solutions and are mostly at par.1254.10 Close to 60 percent of developing countries still operates with a vertically integrated national monopoly utility.1264.11 Most countries deploy some version of the single-buyer model in their power sectors.1284.12 Horizontal unbundling of the distribution sector in Peru created a couple of large profitable metropolitan utilities and a number of small regional utilities with limited scope for profits,2002.1295.1 Private investment in electricity came predominantly from foreign sources and mostly in the generation sector.1485.2 Private investment in independent power producers has been substantial though subject to fluctuations and concentrated in a few countries,19902017 .1495.3 Most countries still depend on a combination of public and private investment for the development of new power generation capacity .1505.4 Private investment shares reveal different drivers .1515.5 Independent power producer investment is moving toward cleaner sources of energy,although capacity expansion lags.1525.6 Competitive procurement of independent power producers varies widely between regions.1525.7 In the early years,most private sector participation in distribution was through concessions,primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean.1575.8 The rise and fall of private sector participation in electricity distribution,19902017.1595.9 Private sector participation in distribution suffers from premature contract cancellation.1606.1 Overview of Regulatory Performance Index.1756.2 Latin American countries were early adopters of regulatory reform,but countries in Africa and Asia caught up fast.1766.3 Tariff and quality regulation are the core responsibilities of regulatory institutions.1766.4 Countries with higher levels of private sector participation in distribution have stronger perceived regulatory performance.1786.5 Regulatory frameworks are not always perceived to function as written on paper.1796.6 Gaps between paper and practice are particularly large on some aspects.1806.7 Countries with higher private sector participation have smaller gaps between de jure and perceived regulation.1816.8 Quality of utility governance seems to be related to positive regulatory performance.1816.9 Achievement of autonomous regulators remains a significant challenge even as regulators are more accountable.1826.10 Certain accountability measures have been universally adopted,whereas others are practiced in only about half of the countries.183x Contents6.11 Regulators autonomy to make legally binding decisions on key issues is perceived to be significantly lower in practice than it looks de jure.1846.12 Most regulatory regimes are closer to rate-of-return regulation,with some incentive-based elements.1866.13 Two-thirds of the observatory countries practice automatic indexation of tariffs.1896.14 Substantial divergence exists between tariff regulation as it appears on paper and as it is actually practiced.1906.15 Tariff recommendations made by regulatory entities are not necessarily respected or applied.1916.16 In India,authorized tariff increases fall well short of those approved by state regulators.1916.17 Tanzania and U