了解中美脱钩：宏观趋势和行业影响-美国全国商会-2021.2-92页.pdf

UNDERSTANDINGDECOUPLING:Macro Trends and Industry ImpactsThe U.S.Chamber of Commerce is the worlds largest business federation representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes,sectors,and regions,as well as state and local chambers and industry associations.Copyright 2021 by the United States Chamber of Commerce.All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any formprint,electronic,or otherwisewithout the express written permission of the publisher.CONTRIBUTING AUTHORSCONTENTSMessage from Staf Executives.2Executive Summary.3Introduction.5How We Got Here.8Understanding the Scope.11The Aggregate Costs of U.S.-China Decoupling.12Aggregate Conclusions.18 A.Aviation Industry.19 Industry Snapshot.19 U.S.-China Engagement.23 Analysis:What Are the Costs?.26 Interpretation:What Does It Mean for the U.S.Economy?.33 B.Semiconductor Industry.34 Industry Snapshot.34 U.S.-China Engagement.36 Analysis:What Are the Costs?.40 Interpretation:What Does It Mean for the U.S.Economy?.46 C.Chemicals Industry.48 Industry Snapshot.48U.S.-China Engagement.53 Analysis:What Are the Costs?.55 Interpretation:What Does It Mean for the U.S.Economy?.59 D.Medical Device Industry.60 Industry Snapshot.60 U.S.-China Engagement.61 Analysis:What Are the Costs?.64 Interpretation:What Does It Mean for the U.S.Economy?.67Conclusions.69Appendix 1:Overview of U.S.Decoupling Policy Toolbox.72Appendix 2:Overview of U.S.Decoupling Literature.79Methodology Appendices.81 A.Aviation.81 B.Semiconductors.83 C.Chemicals.84 D.Medical Devices.862UNDERSTANDING U.S.-CHINA DECOUPLINGMacro Trends and Industry ImpactsMESSAGE FROM STAFF EXECUTIVESThe U.S.and Chinese economies have become deeply intertwined in the last two decades.That interconnectedness has raised alarm bells in both Washington and Beijing in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and as competition accelerates between the two countries on strategic matters and advanced,innovative technology.Understanding both the fault lines and the benefits to the United States of our economic relationship with China as it stands now is critical to preparing for the relationship with China we wantand can live within the future.The U.S.Chamber of Commerces China Center has for the better part of two decades documented both the growth of the U.S.-China economic relationship and the challenges posed by Chinas trade and investment regime for U.S.competitiveness and market access.We have long advocated for a balanced and rational approach to commercial relations with China,one that recognizes the importance of a market of 1.4 billion people,while managing the realities of Chinas political and economic models.This approach included both patience and enthusiasm for the progress toward opening in the years after World Trade Organization(WTO)accession,and,more recently,calling Beijing to account for policies that reversed course from the promises embodied by its entry,and which have put the state and Chinese Communist Party(CCP),rather than market forces,back in the drivers seat.Indeed,as Chinas international ambitions of becoming a global technology powerhouse have continued to risesupported by the increasingly coercive use of economic statecraft globallyits commitment to open-economy,market-based norms has flagged in critical areas.The two countries have attempted to disentangle aspects of our economies in recent years.As the U.S.Chamber of Commerce documented first in our 2010 report Chinas Drive for Indigenous Innovation:A Web of Industrial Policies,which focused on the policies and implementation tools Beijing deployed to reduce reliance on foreign technology,and subsequently in our September 2016 report Preventing Deglobalization:An Economic and Security Argument for Free Trade and Investment in ICT,the initial moves emanated from China.Chinas eforts accelerated in the later stages of Barack Obamas presidency with Made in China 2025 and continued throughout the Trump Administration.These and other reports from the Chamber provided the analytical foundation for the Trump Administrations 2017 Section 301 investigation into Chinas forced technology transfer policies,as well as other eforts to address Chinas industrial policies.The United States responded in a measured way in the Obama years,and with increasing vigor under the Trump Administration,as we documented in our March 2019 report Assessing the Costs of Tarifs on the U.S.ICT Industry:Modeling U.S.-China Tarifs.Notwithstanding those eforts,the two economies remain deeply intertwined.A new administration under President Joe Biden faces a difcult challenge in defining the next stage of economic engagement(or disengagement)with China.Deciding which areas do not pose a threat to national securityand should therefore be left openis a complex task.Some argue that disengagement from China,through reshoring and investment in homegrown innovation,can boost economic activity in the United States.However,without an objective,fact-based examination of the costs and benefits of the U.S.-China economic relationshipand the economic impact of disentangling that relationshipthat argument is purely speculative.With this study,the U.S.Chamber of Commerce China Center seeks to educate policymakers,businesses,and other stakeholders to make informed decisions about serious challenges embodying difcult tradeofs.By analyzing the economic impact of the scenario of a fully decoupled relationship,at least in certain key sectors,we hope to better illuminate the choices that policymakers will have to make to identify the optimal degree of economic engagement with China.In so doing,the U.S.Chamber of Commerce will continue to be a vocal proponent of open markets and free trade that is mutually beneficial,safe,and secure,while also remaining a vocal critic of trade and commercial practices that present challenges to the rules-based global economic order or are unfair to American businesses.Charles FreemanSenior Vice President,AsiaU.S.Chamber of CommerceJeremie WatermanPresident,China CenterU.S.Chamber of Commerce 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARYConceived in 2019,this study seeks to illuminate the costs of decoupling for the United States.The analysis has been complicated over the past year by a shifting landscape.Tensions between the U.S.and China have grown in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak,triggering a broader debate about supply chains,reshoring,and resilience.In truth,because of the many variables at play,it is beyond the capacity of economics to deliver a precise answer regarding the costs of decoupling.Nonetheless,this study ofers what we believe is a valuable perspective on the magnitude and range of economic efects that the Biden administration should consider as it weighs its policy agenda with China.The study highlights the potential costs of decoupling from two perspectives:the aggregate costs to the U.S.economy and the industry-level costs in four areas important to the national interest.Key findings of our assessment of the aggregate costs of decoupling to the U.S.economy include the following:In the trade channel,if 25%tarifs were expanded to cover all two-way trade,the U.S.would forgo$190 billion in GDP annually by 2025.The stakes are even higher when accounting for how lost U.S.market access in China today creates revenue and job losses,lost economies of scale,smaller research and development(R&D)budgets,and diminished competitiveness.In the investment channel,if decoupling leads to the sale of half of the U.S.foreign direct investment(FDI)stock in China,U.S.investors would lose$25 billion per year in capital gains,and models point to one-time GDP losses of up to$500 billion.Reduced FDI from China to the U.S.would add to the costs andby flowing elsewhere insteadlikely benefit U.S.competitors.In people flows,the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the economic impact from lost Chinese tourism and education spending.If future flows are reduced by half from their pre-COVID levels,the U.S.would lose between$15 billion and$30 billion per year in services trade exports.In idea flows,decoupling would undermine U.S.productivity and innovation,but quantification in this regard is difcult.U.S.business R&D at home to support operations in China would fall and companies from other countries would reduce R&D spending related to their China ambitions in the U.S.The longer-term implications could include supply chain diversion away from U.S.players,less attraction for venture capital investment in U.S.innovation,and global innovation competition as other nations try to fill the gap.In terms of industry-level costs,we find the following:For the U.S.aviation industry,decoupling would mean reduced aircraft sales resulting in lower U.S.manufacturing output,falling revenues for the firms involved,and thus U.S.job losses and reduced R&D spendingleading to diminished U.S.competitiveness.We estimate that a complete loss of access to Chinas market for U.S.aircraft and commercial aviation services would create U.S.output losses ranging from$38 billion to$51 billion annually.Cumulatively,lost market share impacts would add up to$875 billion by 2038.For the U.S.semiconductor industry,forgoing the China market would mean lower economies of scale and R&D spendingand a less central role in the full web of global technology supply chains.Decoupling would prompt some foreign firms to“de-Americanize”their semiconductor activities,putting to the test whether that is possible and further motivating China to seek self-sufciency.Lost access to Chinese customers would cause the U.S.industry$54 billion to$124 billion in lost output,risking more than 100,000 jobs,$12 billion in R&D spending,and$13 billion in capital spending.For the U.S.chemicals industry,decoupling would mean a smaller U.S.share in Chinas growing market,diversification by China and others from U.S.suppliers,lost competitiveness,and lower R&D spending.This decrease would ofset the newfound competitive advantages the U.S.enjoys from lower feedstock costs,thanks 4UNDERSTANDING U.S.-CHINA DECOUPLINGMacro Trends and Industry Impactsto improved extraction technologies.From the imposition of tarifs alone,the potential cost ranges from$10.2 billion in U.S.payroll and output reductions and 26,000 lost jobs to more than$38 billion in output losses and nearly 100,000 lost jobs.For the U.S.medical devices industry,decoupling would mean the added cost of reshoring supply chains and restricted product and intermediate input imports from China,along with retaliation against U.S.exports by Beijing.Abandoned market share in China would go to competitors,boosting their economies of scale and handing them future revenue from the market in China,where both rising incomes and an aging population are driving demand for medical devices.U.S.lost market share is valued at$23.6 billion in annual revenue,amounting to lost revenue exceeding$479 billion over a decade.These estimations are derived from economic models of“normal”before the COVID-19 pandemic;the macroeconomic assumptions about future supply and demand that such models depend on must now be viewed with great skepticism.Moreover,they explore only the economic welfare efects:they do not attempt to price in the costs or benefits to U.S.security,which is a critical factor in the rethink of engagement with China.But the analysis does point to a number of important takeaways for U.S.policymakers,even with the caveats about the limits of economic modeling amid a global disruption:First,data analysis is critical to policymaking.China policy requires economic impact assessment,cost-benefit analysis,and a process of public debate and discovery.Second,even based on our rough assessment,we can see that the costs of anything approaching“full”decoupling are uncomfortably high.Alternative approachesincluding mitigation and in many cases forbearancewould complement any decoupling scenario.Third,many elements merit inclusion in a comprehensive U.S.-China policy program,from promoting industry and innovation and technology to preserving the rules-based,open market order and its institutions,and protecting systemically and strategically important assets and industries from threats.In the policy reengineering to come,the central role of market forces in determining winners,and governments finite capacity to redistribute resources to ease the process,must be respected.Finally,working with like-minded partners on a plurilateral basis to harmonize regulatory approaches in priority areas and to take coordinated actions that address shared concerns over Chinas practices is essential to minimizing the costs to the U.S.economy and preventing the erosion of U.S.comparative advantage that would occur if decoupling policies are implemented solely on a unilateral basis.5 INTRODUCTION The U.S.and China are integrated in a seemingly inextricable embrace by virtue of their direct relationship and their respective roles in the global supply chain.The direct trading relationship accounting for goods and services was$737.1 billion in 2018,before the start of the trade war.If one accounts for third country markets through which U.S.-China trade in intermediate goods pass,that number reaches even higher.Yet the underlying policy assumptions fostering that integration are now being challenged in both countries.Basic calculations about respective strategic and economic intentions have changed,and an implicit bargain between Beijing and Washington about the trading relationship seems to have broken.The resulting policy debates in both countries therefore have far-reaching consequences.There are legitimate reasons for both parties to consider an alternative relationship,but if the U.S.and China were to systematically close of economic engagementin a word,decoupleit would not come without costs.Identifying the real consequences and costs of decoupling is urgent because initial steps toward such an act have already been taken.The U.S.is debating(both in public and in private strategy discussions)whether and how to continue down this path.The prospect of U.S.-China decoupling has never been more real.The U.S.Chamber of Commerces China Center has long advocated for a balanced and rational approach to commercial relations with China.This approach included both patience and enthusiasm for the progress toward opening in the years after World Trade Organization(WTO)accession,1 andincreasinglycalling Beijing to account for policies that reversed course from the promises embodied by entry into the WTO,policies that put the state and Chinese Communist Party(CCP),rather than market forces,back in the drivers seat.Yet as Chinas international ambitions have continued to rise,supported by the increasingly coercive use of economic statecraft,its commitment to open-economy,market-based norms has flagged.From Chinas Indigenous Innovation initiatives in 2009,to Made in China 2025 in 2015,to a new generation of state controls on da