兰德-美国遏制俄罗斯最优策略：增加能源产出！并号召其他国家也这样做（地缘政治） -2019.4-355页.pdf

Extending RussiaCompeting from Advantageous GroundJames Dobbins,Raphael S.Cohen,Nathan Chandler,Bryan Frederick,Edward Geist,Paul DeLuca,Forrest E.Morgan,Howard J.Shatz,Brent WilliamsC O R P O R AT I O NLimited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis document and trademark(s)contained herein are protected by law.This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only.Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited.Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only,as long as it is unaltered and complete.Permission is required from RAND to reproduce,or reuse in another form,any of its research documents for commercial use.For information on reprint and linking permissions,please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure,healthier and more prosperous.RAND is nonprofit,nonpartisan,and committed to the public interest.RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RANDMake a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contributewww.rand.orgLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN:978-1-9774-0021-5For more information on this publication,visit www.rand.org/t/RR3063Published by the RAND Corporation,Santa Monica,Calif.Copyright 2019 RAND CorporationR is a registered trademark.Cover:Pete Soriano/Adobe StockiiiPrefaceThis report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia:Competing from Advantageous Ground,sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office,Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8,Headquarters,Department of the Army.The purpose of the project was to examine a range of possible means to extend Russia.By this,we mean nonviolent measures that could stress Russias military or econ-omy or the regimes political standing at home and abroad.The steps we posit would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose,although they might contribute to both.Rather,these steps are conceived of as measures that would lead Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advan-tage,causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence.This report deliberately covers a wide range of military,eco-nomic,and political policy options.Its recommendations are directly relevant to everything from military modernization and force posture to economic sanctions and diplomacy;consequently,it speaks to all the military services,other parts of U.S.government that have a hand in foreign policy,and the broader foreign and defense policy audience.The Project Unique Identification Code(PUIC)for the project that produced this document is HQD177526.This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Centers Strategy,Doctrine,and Resources Program.RAND Arroyo Center,iv Extending Russia:Competing from Advantageous Groundpart of the RAND Corporation,is a federally funded research and development center(FFRDC)sponsored by the U.S.Army.The RAND Corporation operates under a“Federal-Wide Assur-ance”(FWA00003425)and complies with the Code of Federal Regu-lations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law(45 CFR 46),also known as“the Common Rule,”as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in U.S.Department of Defense Instruction 3216.02.As applicable,this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RANDs Institutional Review Board(the Human Subjects Protection Committee)and by the U.S.Army.The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.government.vContentsPreface.iiiFigures and Tables.ixSummary.xiAcknowledgments.xxiiiAbbreviations.xxvCHAPTER ONEIntroduction.1Methodology.3Overview and the Central Argument of the Report.5CHAPTER TWORussias Anxieties and Vulnerabilities.7Russia Since 1991.10Contemporary Russian Military.14Contemporary Russian Economy.21Contemporary Russian Politics.29Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy.37Russian Anxieties.43CHAPTER THREEEconomic Measures.47Recent Russian Economic Performance.48Measure 1:Hinder Petroleum Exports.54Measure 2:Reduce Natural Gas Exports and Hinder Pipeline Expansions.59vi Extending Russia:Competing from Advantageous GroundMeasure 3:Impose Sanctions.69Measure 4:Enhance Russian Brain Drain.85Recommendations.90CHAPTER FOURGeopolitical Measures.95Measure 1:Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine.96Measure 2:Increase Support to the Syrian Rebels.103Measure 3:Promote Regime Change in Belarus.109Measure 4:Exploit Tensions in the South Caucasus.115Measure 5:Reduce Russian Influence in Central Asia.121Measure 6:Challenge Russian Presence in Moldova.130Recommendations.135CHAPTER FIVEIdeological and Informational Measures.137Pathways for Influence Operations.138Current Status of Russian Regime Legitimacy.140Russian Domestic Environment.144Policy Measures to Diminish Domestic and Foreign Support for the Russian Regime.158Recommendations.170CHAPTER SIXAir and Space Measures.173Measure 1:Change Air and Space Force Posture and Operations.175Measure 2:Increase Aerospace Research and Development.182Measure 3:Increase Air and Missile Components of the Nuclear Triad.189Recommendations .192CHAPTER SEVENMaritime Measures.195Measure 1:Increase U.S.and Allied Naval Force Posture and Presence.197Measure 2:Increase Naval Research and Development Efforts.203Measure 3:Shift Nuclear Posture Toward SSBNs.206Measure 4:Check the Black Sea Buildup.207Recommendations.211Contents viiCHAPTER EIGHT Land and Multidomain Measures.213Measure 1:Increase U.S.and NATO Land Forces in Europe.214Measure 2:Increase NATO Exercises in Europe.228Measure 3:Withdraw from the INF Treaty.238Measure 4:Invest in New Capabilities to Manipulate Russian Risk Perceptions .254Recommendations.267CHAPTER NINEConclusions.271Implications and Recommendations for the Army.276References.279ixFigures and TablesFigures 2.1.Gross Domestic Product of Russian Federation,19892016.12 2.2.2016 Defense Spending of Russia,Saudi Arabia,India,France,and United Kingdom.16 2.3.Net Inflows for Foreign Direct Investment in the Russian Federation,19922016.23 2.4.Russian Population Natural Growth Rate and Life Expectancy,19602015.27 2.5.Number of Terrorist Attacks and Resulting Fatalities in Russia.35 3.1.Value of the Reserve Fund,20122018.51 3.2.Value of the National Wealth Fund,20122018.52 3.3.Russian Export Percentages by Broad Sector,20122016.55 3.4.Import Share Percentages of Russian Gas Exports,2016.60 3.5.Russias Population Pyramid,2015.85 4.1.Georgia,Abkhazia,and South Ossetia.116 4.2.Russian Goods Exports and the Founding Members of the EEU .122 8.1.Active Component European NATO and Russian Army Troops,19892016.215 8.2.Approximate Maximum Range of INF-Compliant Short-Range Missiles Fired from Russian Territory.241 8.3.Number of Naval Platforms Capable of Firing Land-Attack Cruise Missiles,19892015.243x Extending Russia:Competing from Advantageous GroundTables 2.1.Current Military Vulnerabilities of the Russian Federation.20 2.2.Current Economic Vulnerabilities of the Russian Federation.30 2.3.Current Domestic Political Vulnerabilities of the Russian Federation.36 2.4.Current Foreign Policy Vulnerabilities of the Russian Federation.42 3.1.Findings for Economic Measures.91 4.1.Findings for Geopolitical Measures.136 5.1.Findings for Ideological Measures.171 6.1.Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements.190 6.2.Findings for Air and Space Measures.193 7.1.Russian and U.S.Naval Force Levels,2015.196 7.2.Findings for Maritime Measures.211 8.1.Findings for Land and Multidomain Measures.268 9.1.Extending Russia Summary of Findings .274xiSummaryThe maxim that“Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears”remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.1 In some respects,contemporary Russia is a country in stagnation.Its economy is dependent on natural resource exports,so falling oil and gas prices have caused a significant drop in the living standards of many Russian citizens.Economic sanctions have further contrib-uted to this decline.Russian politics is increasingly authoritarian,with no viable political alternative to the highly personalized rule of Presi-dent Vladimir Putin.Militarily and politically,the Russian Federation wields much less global influence than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War,a condition Putin is trying to change.In addition to these real vulnerabilities,Russia also suffers from deep-seated anxieties about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change,loss of great-power status,and even military attack.Yet these problems belie the fact that Russia is an extraordinarily powerful country that,despite its systemic weaknesses,manages to be a peer competitor of the United States in some key domains.While not the superpower that the Soviet Union was,Russia has gained eco-nomic strength and international weight under Putin and now boasts much greater military capabilities than any country with similar defense spendingto such a degree that it can exert its influence over immediate neighbors.Moreover,while still conventionally inferior to the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO)1 The origin of this quote is unclear,but it has been around for hundreds of years.See Mark N.Katz,“Policy Watch:Is Russia Strong or Weak?”UPI,July10,2006.xii Extending Russia:Competing from Advantageous Groundallies when they are judged as a whole,Russia can and does threaten the United States and its allies through other meansshort of conven-tional conflict.Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevita-ble,this report seeks to define areas where the United States can do so to its advantage.We examine a range of nonviolent measures that could exploit Russias actual vulnerabilities and anxieties as a way of stressing Russias military and economy and the regimes political standing at home and abroad.The steps we examine would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose,although they might contribute to both.Rather,these steps are conceived of as elements in a cam-paign designed to unbalance the adversary,leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advan-tage,and causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence.Economic PoliciesOf all the measures we examined,expanding U.S.energy production and imposing trade and financial sanctions on Russia seem most likely to further stress the Russian economy,government budget,and defense spending.Russia needs oil export revenues to maintain its government operations,including military activities abroad and the provision of social services and pensions at home.Limits to oil revenues will lead Russia to make difficult choices beyond those it has had to make already.Global oil prices and production are beyond the full control of a single country,but the United States can adopt policies that expand world supply and thus depress global prices,thereby limiting Russian revenue.Imposing tougher sanctions is also likely to degrade the Russian economy,and could do so to a greater extent and more quickly than maintaining low oil prices,provided the sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral.Effectiveness of this approach will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process.Furthermore,sanctions come with substantial costs and considerable risks and will Summary xiiionly have impact if widely adopted.In contrast,maximizing U.S.oil production entails little cost or risk,might produce second-order bene-fits for the U.S.economy,and does not need multilateral endorsement.Increasing Europes ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia presents a third,longer-term,and more expensive effort that could economically extend Russia and buffer Europe against Russian energy coercion.Europe is slowly moving in this direction by building regasifi-cation plants for liquefied natural gas.To truly be effective,this measure would need global natural gas markets to become more flexible.In a similarly far-reaching scenario,encouraging the emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth could help the United States and hurt Russia,but any effects,both positive for the United States and negative for Russia,would be difficult to notice except over a very long period.Russias poor economic policies have hampered growth and are likely to continue doing so.Although some areas have improved,such as the cleanup of the banking sector,Russian economic policy throughout the late 2000s and into the 2010s was often counterproductive.Doing nothing,although not an active measure on the part of the United States,would also let the Russian government continue its poor regulatory regime,its state control,and its wasteful investments,all of which would continue to limit the countrys economic weight and military potential.Ideological and Informational MeasuresRussias long-standing concern about the vulnerability of its people to information threatsparticularly fear of what the Russians view as Western propagandaand the Russian governments demonstrated propensity to intervene in public discourse when it feels threatened have strengthened the countrys resistance to foreign influence oper-ations.Traditional media in Russia are,with rare exceptions,under secure pro-regime control,leaving the internet as the primary means of reaching the population directly.Moreover,Russian regime narratives predispose much of the population to be skeptical of anti-regime mes-sages coming from abroad.xiv Extending Russia:Competing from Advantageous GroundDespite these difficulties,limited effects on Russian domestic sta-bility and international image could be achieved by a Western infor-mation campaign that helped to undermine key aspects of the regimes claim to legitimacy and worked in tandem with preexisting regime vulnerabilities on such issues as corruption.However,such a strategy would be risky.Western involvement in Russian politics in this manner could give the regime both cover and an incentive to institute a violent crackdown on domestic anti-regime groups and activists.It might also lead Moscow to expand its already considerable efforts to destabilize Western democratic systems.This approach might initiate a second ideological Cold War between Russia and the West,from which de-escalation could be difficult.Nevertheless,recent Russian efforts to subvert Western democra-cies provide a powerful rationale for some sort of counter campaign to serve as retribution,rees