麦格理-全球宏观经济年中展望：贸易战和它造成的损失-2019.7.8-47页.pdf

8 July 2019 Global Sales and Trading personnel at Macquarie are not independent and,therefore,the information herein may be subject to certain conflicts of interest,and may have been shared with other parties prior to publication.Note:To the extent Macquarie Research is referenced,it is identified as such and the associated disclaimers are included in the published research report.Please refer to the important disclosures STRATEGY Economists/Strategists Macquarie Securities(Australia)Limited Ric Deverell +61 2 8232 4307 Justin Fabo +61 2 8232 0696 Hayden Skilling,CFA +61 2 8232 2623 Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd.David Doyle,CFA +1 416 848 3663 Neil Shankar +1 416 607 5055 Macquarie Capital Limited Larry Hu,PhD +852 3922 3778 Irene Wu +852 39223796 Lynn Zhao +86 21 2412 9035 Melody Dong +86 21 2412 9085 Macquarie Capital(Europe)Limited Tom Price +44 203 037 2849 Vivienne Lloyd +44 20 3037 4530 Serafino Capoferri +44 20 3037 2517 Jim Lennon,Senior Commodities Consultant+44 20 3037 4271 Eimear Daly +44 20 3037 4802 Macquarie Bank Limited Singapore Branch Gareth Berry +65 6601 0348 Macquarie Futures USA LLC Thierry Wizman +1 212 231 2082 Macquarie Bank Limited Hong Kong Branch Trang Thuy Le +852 3922 2113 This publication has been prepared by Sales and Trading personnel at Macquarie and is not a product of the Macquarie Research Department.Global Economic and Markets Outlook:Mid-Year Update The Tariffs and the Damage Done This year marks the 10th anniversary of the global expansion,making it the longest in the post-war period.While global GDP growth has averaged a respectable 2%saar a pace similar to the average of the past 40 years in the main it has felt unfulfilling,as central banks have worked(mostly unassisted by the political classes)to support output in the face of numerous structural headwinds.While we dont think expansions die of old age,the ongoing slowdown,along with the recent tariff increases,has seen markets once again contemplate the possibility of recession.The big“known unknown”is the path of the trade war.While the probability of a further escalation is difficult to assess,in our central scenario we assume the US announces a 10%tariff on the remaining imports from China in September,before a longer-lasting“ceasefire”in the New Year,just in time for the US election(we see the probability of an H2 escalation as something like 60%).In this world,after slowing to around 2%saar in Q2,global GDP growth is likely to dip to a little below 2%by Q4,before gradually recovering next year,as Fed easing,Chinese stimulus(we expect another push in early Q4)and diminished trade uncertainty support activity.While the risk of recession continues to build the NY Feds yield curve-based model estimates a probability of around 30%the slowdown still feels more like a repeat of 2012 and 2016 than the beginning of something more sinister.With trade and industrial production already weak,however,the risk is that business investment continues to slow in the face of higher tariffs and policy uncertainty(as has already occurred in the UK as Brexit uncertainty weighs).Businesses could also slow hiring,which in turn could hit consumption.We expect the Fed to cut the fed funds rate three times over the next 6 months,while the ECB will cut the deposit rate by 10 basis points to minus 50,and possibly restart QE.Long-term interest rates are likely to fall modestly further in H2,but then move a little higher over 2020 as growth recovers.However,with growth in the US expected to be around trend next year,it is unlikely the Fed will be able to reverse the cuts ahead of the next mini downturn that could arrive sometime in 2021,suggesting limited upside for yields.Higher tariffs could see currency safe havens benefit in H2,with the US dollar and the Yen the prime beneficiaries.However,as the year comes to an end,enthusiasm for a“weak”dollar among the US political classes could build.For commodity markets this suggests further downward pressure over the remainder of this year,although as always performance will diverge,with gold benefiting from the uncertainty while iron ore and copper come under pressure.Equity markets are already pricing recovery,and could feel disappointed in the next few months as growth slows.However,history suggests that the market is likely to be supported by the economic recovery in 2020 once the Fed“put”is in play,equities only fall materially if the economy tips into recession.Global Economic and Markets Outlook:Mid-Year Update 8 July 2019 2 Contents Global economic outlook:In the eye of the tariff storm.3 United States:Trade policy uncertainty and slower growth.9 China:Stimulus could escalate later this year.13 Eurozone:ECB lift-off unlikely before the next downturn.17 Japan:Sustained monetary accomodation amid weak inflation.20 Australia:Cork in the ocean.23 New Zealand:Cork in the ocean(too).27 Canada:Stabilization,but structural imbalances remain.29 EMs ex-China&India:A disproportionate growth drag.31 Rates outlook:Time for“Insurance”.33 FX outlook:Hinging on the CNY,but USD policy will matter too.37 Commodities outlook:Demand,impaired.39 Equities outlook:The Fed put vs.sluggish growth.43 Economic and market forecasts.45 Global Economic and Markets Outlook:Mid-Year Update 8 July 2019 3 Global economic outlook:In the eye of the tariff storm 2018/2019 taxonomy of a slowdown“You have to know the past to understand the present”.Carl Sagan The global slowdown that commenced in late 2017 has continued in recent months,with the pace of GDP growth dipping to something like 2%saar in Q2,down from 2%in Q1.While fears of recession have increased,growth remains significantly stronger than the low point in the mini-cycles of 2016 and 2012(1%and 1%respectively)and well above the 1%y/y seen at the trough of most“global recessions”see A short history of“global recessions”-The US in the driving seat.The initial phase of the slowdown was part of the regular cycle growth was never likely to stay at the well above average 3%pace seen in 2017Q3 however,the weakness over the past year looks to have been exacerbated by the trade war between the US and China,with the fading US fiscal stimulus also a factor this year.Fig 1 Global growth has dipped meaningfully below average Fig 2 with the slowdown in trade weighing on both industrial production and GDP Source:NBER,Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy Source:IMF,Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy As shown in the accompanying figures,global trade,industrial production and GDP have on average grown at the same pace in recent years,with the cycles heavily interrelated industrial production and trade tend to have a higher cyclical amplitude,while GDP is a little smoother.Following the imposition of US tariffs on$250 billion of US imports between July and September last year,global trade volumes declined heavily,falling by 2.9%between October and December.This weighed on global IP,with the level of production essentially flat from October to April around the weakest it has been in recent decades(outside recession).With a lag,the trade and IP weakness has also begun to weigh on GDP,with growth slowing from an above-average 3%saar in H1 last year to a below-average 2%saar in Q2 this year.The biggest impact on domestic demand has been through business investment,with growth slowing in most of the major economies in the past year.While consumption growth has also slowed,as is normally the case it has been less impacted.As we previously demonstrated,this is not terribly surprising as consumption(and services in particular)rarely moves as much as trade,production and investment,even during recession.-15-12-9-6-3036912158085909500051015Per centGlobal IP Growth3m/3m annualised*Dashed line indicates post-1980 average,while grey shaded areas indicate US recessions.951001051101151201251213141516171819IndexGlobal Trade&Output*January 2012=100Industrial productionReal tradeGDP*Dashed lines indicate implementationof major US-China tariffsRic Deverell +61 2 8232 4307 Hayden Skilling,CFA+61 2 8232 2623 Global Economic and Markets Outlook:Mid-Year Update 8 July 2019 4 Fig 3 Trade,GDP and industrial production growth tend to cycle together,with GDP more stable than the others Fig 4 Global trade is a key factor in global investment,with the trade weakness beginning to weigh as uncertainty builds Source:IMF,Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy Source:Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy The outlook:Living on the edge The key question for markets is whether the slowdown will continue,or whether a base is being formed?To that end,the recent hard data have been encouraging,with global industrial production momentum(3m/3m saar)improving from zero in February to around 2%in May.In normal circumstances,this rebound would suggest that broader measures of global growth will soon bottom out,and that a recovery will start in the second half of the year.In the current cycle,however,the trade threat remains front and centre,with the full impact of the May/June tariff increases yet to be seen.To that end,the PMI surveys have not reflected the improvement in the hard production data,with the global manufacturing PMI falling further in June the new orders component has dipped again,after earlier signs of stabilisation while the composite PMI was flat.This,along with the fact that global trade has yet to recover back in line with the level of global IP suggests that growth could slow further in Q3(see Global Trade Is the recovery over before it began?).With a further 10%tariff on the remainder of the USs imports from China expected in September,we suspect growth will continue to slow in Q4.In many economies,GDP in Q1 was flattered by an inventory and net export boost that will unwind in Q2,suggesting that the Q2 GDP outturn could be materially weaker than Q1.Fig 5 Global IP momentum has been recovering since February,although the global PMI has fallen again recently Fig 6 with the recovery broad-based outside the US,which continues to lag Source:IHS Markit,Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy Source:Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy 1.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.5-8-6-4-2024681012141516171819Per centPer centGlobal Trade&Output 3m/3m annualised growthIndustrial production(LHS)Real trade(LHS)GDP(quarterly,RHS)-20-15-10-5051015209800020406081012141618Per centBusiness Investment&Global TradeQuarterly,year-ended growthGlobal real tradeMajor advanced economies*,real business investment*Includes Canada,Germany,Japan,UK,and US46474849505152535455-2-101234561213141516171819IndexPer centGlobal Industrial Production GrowthIndustrial production growth,annualised 3m/3m(LHS)Global manufacturing PMI(RHS)Industrial production growth,monthly(LHS)Average(1980-Present)-6-4-20246810121213141516171819Per centIP Growth3m/3m annualisedChinaGlobalex-US&ChinaUS Global Economic and Markets Outlook:Mid-Year Update 8 July 2019 5 Policy to the rescue?While the temptation is to focus on the negative,as we noted in The Slowdown Scare of 2019 Mid-cycle correction or impending recession?,the global economy has had several“mini cycles”in the past decade,with central banks turning dovish each time growth has slowed.And while there is less monetary policy ammunition than seen in the past,the US and China remain the main drivers of the global economy(growth in Japan and Europe is essentially derivative),with both retaining significant capacity to stimulate.In the US,the Fed is likely to cut the fed funds rate by 75 basis points over the next 6-9 months,with long-term rates having already fallen dramatically the 10-year is down 120 basis points to 2%and the key 30-year mortgage rate has fallen by a similar amount since November.Working against this,however,is the fact that the fiscal stimulus continues to abate,with recent CBO estimates suggesting that fiscal spending could turn contractionary later this year.In China,while the initial stimulus late last year has faded,as growth continues to slow we expect policy to once again turn accommodative in Q4 see G20 and China June PMI In line with consensus,still too early for big stimulus.Fig 7 US 30-year mortgage rates have fallen materially,providing a big boost to the economy Fig 8 Working against that,the fiscal stimulus turns to a drag this year Source:Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy Source:BEA,CBO,Macquarie Macro Strategy This all suggests to us that while global growth will remain subdued for a time,absent another major tariff increase,it should begin to recover early next year.Indeed,if there is no trade war escalation later this year,the recovery could occur more quickly than suggested by our central scenario.That said,we suspect that the upswing next year could be more modest than those seen in previous mini cycles,a phenomenon likely to be exacerbated by the fact that unemployment is now very low in the major economies,suggesting that there is little spare capacity.China is likely to continue to structurally slow,while the US looks unlikely to benefit from another fiscal stimulus.Looking further ahead,if the recent pattern is repeated,the US and global economies could enter yet another“slowdown”scare in 18 months to 2 years time,with the risk of recession in the coming year or two after that relatively high given diminished policy space and very tight labour markets.With the trade war still working its way through the system,we doubt the Fed will be game to hike during the coming slow upswing,which will mean we enter the 2021 downturn with even less policy space than at present.In this world,most of the other major central banks keep rates at end 2019 levels through 2020.3.03.54.04.55.05.510111213141516171819Per centUS 30-Year Mortgage Rate-10-8-6-4-202468101Q173Q171Q183Q181Q193Q191Q203Q20Per centUS Federal Government SpendingNominal,quarterly annualised growthActualForecasts Global Economic and Markets Outlook:Mid-Year Update 8 July 2019 6 Fig 9 We expect GDP growth to begin to recover later this year,but for the recovery to remain relatively subdued Fig 10 Recent up cycles have lasted around 2 years,suggesting the next“slowdown scare”could arrive in 2021 Source:IMF,Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy Source:IHS Markit,IMF,Macrobond,Macquarie Macro Strategy Risks Unsurprisingly,the key risk remains yet another increase in trade tensions.While peace was declared at the G-20 meeting in late June,Mr Trump has in the past shown that such agreements can prove fleeting,with the risk of further tariffs still very real.A Q1“truce”ahead of the election is our base case,but we suspect that the tensions between China and the US will be ongoing,and see little prospect of a near term“solution”that involves all of the recent tariffs being removed.If the tensions continue to escalate,we suspect the impact could be significant.In a speech on 2 July,Bank of England Governor,Mark Carney,noted that“while traditional models suggest that the direct effects of the tariff measures implemented so far are likely to be small,these est