CNAS-中国在国际组织中的新兴修正主义（英文）-2019.5-32页.pdf

MAY 2019Peoples Republic of the United NationsChinas Emerging Revisionism in International OrganizationsKristine Lee and Alexander SullivanAbout the AuthorsALEXANDER SULLIVAN is an Adjunct Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security(CNAS),where he focuses on U.S.-China relations,U.S.alliances,and the role of energy in geopolitics.He also is a doctoral student in political science at Georgetown University,focusing on international negotiation,power politics,and U.S.-China relations.KRISTINE LEE,a Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security(CNAS),specializes in U.S.national security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region,with a particular focus on Northeast Asia.Lees honors include receiving a Fulbright scholarship to South Korea.She earned her Bachelor of Arts in history and literature from Harvard College,where she was editor-in-chief of the Harvard International Review.She earned her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School,focusing on Asian security studies.Acknowledgments While the authors alone accept responsibility for what is written,they give thanks to Abigail Grace(who provided feedback on an earlier draft of this report),Roger Cliff,Shanthi Kalathil,Tanvi Madan,Hunter Marston,Ted Piccone,Michael Pillsbury,Matthew Schrader,Jennifer Staats,Jacob Stokes,Ali Wyne,and others.We are deliberately omitting the names of senior officials from whom we also have benefited.This report would not have been possible without assistance from a variety of CNAS colleagues,including Daniel Kliman,Ashley Feng(who also provided feedback on an earlier draft of this report),Joshua Fitt,Neil Bhatiya,Eric Brewer,Melody Cook,Richard Fontaine,Allison Francis,James Park,Maura McCarthy,Ellen McHugh,Ely Ratner,Elizabeth Rosenberg,Loren Schulman,Matthew Seeley,and Hannah Suh.Cover ArtGetty Image Adapted by CNASAbout the Asia-Pacific Security Program The CNAS Asia-Pacific Security Program addresses opportunities and challenges for the United States in the region,with a growing focus on issues that originate in the Asia-Pacific but have global implications.It draws on a team with deep government and nongovernment expertise in regional studies,U.S.foreign policy,international security,and economic statecraft.The Asia-Pacific Security Program analyzes trends and generates practical and implementable policy solutions around three main research priorities:U.S.strategic competition with China,American alliances and partnerships,and the North Korea threat.PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED NATIONSChinas Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations01 Executive Summary02 Introduction03 Chinas Evolving Approach to Global Governance06 China and the U.N.SystemSeven Snapshots 15 Implications 17 Recommendations 18 Conclusion ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY|MAY 2019Peoples Republic of the United Nations 1Executive Summaryhina is increasingly using its economic,political,and institutional power to change the global governance system from within.The Chinese Communist Party(CCP)under President Xi Jinping has become more proactive in injecting its ideological concepts into international statements of consensus and harnessing the programmatic dimensions of global governance to advance its own foreign policy strategies,such as“One Belt,One Road.”1 These efforts demand the attention of the United States,its allies and partners,and civil society.If unchecked,they will hasten the export of some of the most harmful aspects of Chinas political system,including corruption,mass surveillance,and the repression of individual and collective rights.This report examines Chinas approach to seven organs and functions of the United Nations(U.N.):the Department of Economic and Social Affairs,the Human Rights Council,Peacekeeping Operations,Accreditation for Non-Governmental Organizations,the International Telecommunication Union,UNESCO,and the Office of Drugs and Crime.This examination yields the following insights into Beijings emerging strategy in the context of international organizations,which seeks to advance Chinas interests and values through:Promoting a particularist view of human rights,in which governments can cite“unique”local condi-tions to justify disregard for individual or minority claims.This fundamentally runs counter to the American belief that human rights belong to indi-viduals and cannot be violated on the whims of a single government.Redefining democracy in terms of so-called“economic and social rights,”rather than inalienable civil or political rights.This privileges the exigencies of state-led development over fundamental rights of association and expression,and it weakens the standing of these rights in international law.2 Making state sovereignty inviolable and reestab-lishing states as the only legitimate stakeholders,with the purported aim of“democratizing”interna-tional relations and setting developing countries on equal footing in the global governance system.Infusing consensus global goals with Chinese ideo-logical terms and foreign policy strategies such as the Belt and Road.Resolving political issues through bilateral nego-tiations,where China can use its full panoply of leverage to get its way,rather than through rules-based approaches.These activities transcend Chinas traditional defensive posture in international organizations,in which it was careful to avoid confrontation with the United States and instead directed its diplomatic resources toward boxing in Taiwan and preventing criticism of China.Today,rather than focusing on narrow and self-defined“core interests”such as isolating Taiwan or forestalling criticism of Chinese policies in Xinjiang or Tibet,Beijing now also seeks to grow its clout by extending its concepts of human rights and sovereignty to other illiberal states.3 In short,China,through its behavior in international organizations,is making the world safe for autocracy.CCNASDC2SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONSAs the United States moves to compete with China across the diplomatic,economic,and military domains,it cannot overlook international organizations,which are a key battleground for determining which set of values will shape the 21st century.Washington must take Beijings approach seriouslyand reengage,starting with the U.N.system.Key actions for the United States include:Understand Chinas Strategy Develop a comprehensive operating picture of Chinas activities within international organizations by ensuring that U.S.diplomats participate in meetings of international organizations,standing up a new fusion cell at the U.S.Department of State,and engaging more deeply with U.S.allies and partners in a dialogue on this topic.Learn from Taiwans experience as a primary target for Beijing in international organizations to identify future tactics that China will use to advance its geopolitical agenda in other areas.Coordinate with industry to identify where Chinese activities in international organizations,such as standards bodies,are creating an uneven economic playing field and positioning Beijing to dominate future technology frontiers.Raise Awareness,Build Consensus,and Strike Back Develop a common list of Chinese ideological terms with allies and partners and lead a cooperative effort to fight the inclusion of these terms in any documents guiding international organizations.Uphold norms and values in the international context by systematically pointing out where Beijings actions depart from both international principles of acceptable conduct and Chinas own stated declarations of its values and intentions.Respond to Chinese human rights violations by leveraging the Magnitsky Act to sanction individual offenders.Deepen Participation in International Organizations Reengage U.N.institutions such as UNESCO,recognizing that American withdrawal from international organizations,regardless of the justification,will still leave a void for China to fill.Invest in the future of U.S.multilateralism by encouraging Americans to take on leadership posts in the United Nations system and developing government fellowships to bring rising talent into the U.S.Mission to the United Nations.4 IntroductionThe rise of China and the United States partial retreat from multilateralism has provoked widespread anxiety over the future of the“liberal international order.”5 Although imbued with a new urgency in the United States today,these questions reflect the continuation of a decades-long debate about how a more powerful China would interact with the international system.Would it seek to sweep aside existing institutions in a decisive,possibly violent bid for undisputed hegemony or endeavor to be integrated into them,adopting their built-in complex of liberal norms and practices?6 There is a growing consensus that the latter prediction has proven incorrect,and more generally that this debate has presented a false dichotomy.7 Instead,with respect to global governance,China is pursuing a hybrid strategy in which it both unilaterally offers its own institutions(and corresponding norms)and introduces them to legacy international organizations to reshape preexisting norms and activities to conform more closely to its own inter-ests.8 Worryingly,as China grows more ideological and authoritarian,these alterations not only cause institu-tions to deviate from their ostensible missions,but they also undermine universal values and U.S.interests.This is particularly true in the arenas of human rights,sustain-able development,and related fields.This report largely focuses on Chinas activities within the United Nations and its specialized agencies.The reasons for this focused scope are twofold:First,as the umbrella framework for global governance,the U.N.system is often the highest-profile stage for international cooperation in any given field;second and relatedly,the volume of information on Chinas activities in U.N.organizations is greater than for those at other levels.Nevertheless,Chinas strategy relies crucially on its activ-ities in regional and multilateral contexts,and many of the ideas expressed herein are applicable to institutions outside of the United Nations.This study excludes the World Trade Organization,the Bretton Woods institu-tions,and extensive examination of the Security Council,as many scholars have analyzed Chinas behavior in these contexts.This report is far from exhaustive.It aims instead to shed light on important but oft-neglected arenas of policy contention,lest international cooper-ation be turned to purposes antithetical to U.S.values and core interests.The report proceeds in the following manner:After elaborating on Chinas strategy in international organi-zations and the opportunities and constraints it faces,it examines a number of case studies that offer insight into ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY|MAY 2019Peoples Republic of the United Nations 3how China is beginning to remake several U.N.bodies in its authoritarian image.The case studies encom-pass bodies as diverse as the Department of Economic and Social Affairs,the Human Rights Council,and the International Telecommunication Union,to name a few.Finally,it concludes with a set of recommendations for how the United States,together with like-minded allies and partners,can best push back where appropriate on Chinas efforts to impose its core national interests on the broader mandates of international organizations.At the end of the day,Chinas incremental erosion of the global governance structure,particularly around human rights,will only be fully successful absent clear,compelling,and consistent leadership from the United States.Chinas Evolving Approach to Global GovernanceChairman Xi Jinpings speech at the 19th Communist Party Congress laid out his vision for a“new era.that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”9 Four decades after Chinas opening to the world,the CCP is confidently proclaiming a newly activist approach to foreign policynotwithstanding that many of the constituent parts of this new approach go back to the administration of Hu Jintao and before.10 China is operating economically and militarily in new places and,as it grows more capable,is discarding long-standing self-imposed restraints on its behavior.11 A central objective of this“new era great-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”is to“take an active part in leading the reform of the global governance system.”12 This section describes what changes China wants to make to the global order,espe-cially in the political and human rights arenas,and how it is going about seeking those changes.The Communist Party sees China as locked in an ideo-logical struggle with liberal democratic nationsone that it does not intend to lose by loosening control.Xi believes that key to accomplishing the“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”is avoiding the fate of the Soviet Union,which,in his perspective,collapsed because it failed to hew closely enough to Leninist ideology.13 In trying to institute economic openness,the Soviet Unionunder“assault”from Western nationssuccumbed to ideological disunity and confusion.Xi sees China as under similar pressure from“hostile forces foreign and domestic”that seek to sow doubt among Chinese citizens about the benevolence and legitimacy of the Communist Partys rule.14 According to this view,global governance institutions,when they promote universal values such as human rights and attempt to articulate limits on state power,are acting as agents of Western ideological hegemony that actively threaten Chinas political stability.15 In shaping global governance,China seeks to insulate itself from criticism of its increasingly repressive political system.This requires Beijing both to pressure individual nations to refrain from disparaging China and to change the standards by which domestic politics and interna-tional cooperation are judged in ways that legitimize Chinas brand of authoritarian corporatism.Chinese leaders and scholars pay close attention to increasing Chinas“discursive power”to weaken threatening norms,such as political freedoms and human rights,and promote Party-friendly ones.International organizations thus have become an arena for ideological contestation,in which Beijings goal is to make authoritarian rule seem as legitimate as democratic government.Xis preferred mantra for this purpose,in keeping with Communist predilections for grand yet vague sloganeering,is the anodyne-sounding“community of shared future for mankind.”16 Peoples Republic of China(PRC)international messaging encompasses such laudable concepts as dialogue,common security,win-win cooperation,and cultural exchanges.Another common Chinese term is the“democratization of international relations,”through which it purportedly endeavors to give greater voice to developing countries in the global President Xi Jinping addresses the U.N.General Assembly on September 28,2015,in New York