J.P. 摩根-全球-宏观策略-全球宏观数据观察-2019.5.10-80页.pdf

Economic ResearchMay 10,2019Global Data Watch Renewed US-China trade war further threatens struggling goods sector Trade war could hold global capex growth to zero this year,and damp China GDP by 0.8%-pt through 2020 Conflict escalation also would amplify easing bias across the globe Next week:US Apr ret sales(cont.0.3%)and IP(mfg 0%),China Apr activity(IP:-1.6),EMU Mar IP(-0.2%)Just when you thought it was safeCentral to our outlook is a view that a set of headwinds facing the global goods sector around the turn of the year was diminishing and that this process would promote a recovery in business sentiment.With the transitory shocks fading and lingering uncertainties resolvingaided by a strong policy shift beginning with the Fed going on holdwe looked for a cyclical lift to take hold around midyear.This week has been a reminder that the fading of transi-tory shocks has yet to translate into a more fundamental lift that supports a cyclical pickup in 2H19.Trade flows from Asia are recovering,but the im-provements lack dynamism.The Euro area looks to have rebounded from the very weak growth in 2H18 but this weeks industrial data suggest the bounce has been short-lived and point to downside risk in the current quarter.Most concerning is that the US-China trade negotiation,which just last week Treas-ury Secretary Mnuchin indicated was“in its final lap,”took a decisive turn for the worse.It is too early to countenance forecast revisions as the latest devel-opments could very well be last-minute negotiating tactics,but it is important to reassess the possible impact of a full-blown US-China trade war.Beneath the surface of diminishing headwinds and an intensifying trade war is a cautiously skeptical business sector.Starting in mid-2018,expectations of future conditions began to slide even as firms maintained a more upbeat as-sessment of current conditions(Figure 1).By late last year,sentiment was falling more broadly.Businesses responded to these fears with slower growth in investment.Although employment gains remain close to cycle highs,global capex(ex.China)appears to have stalled after reaching a short-lived expan-sion high in late 2017.Moreover,the deterioration in business sentiment and capital spending continues.Our latest tracking shows global business confi-dence deteriorating through April,completely reversing the recovery from 2016-17.This weeks escalation in the US-China trade war will no doubt magnify business worries.-1.0-0.50.00.51.02014201520162017201820192020Source:J.P.MorganSt.dev from 2000-pres averageFigure 1:DM manufacturing surveysExpectedCurrent0246818Q118Q319Q119Q3%oya.Shaded model output w/different conf inputsFigure 2:Global*capexSource:J.P.Morgan(*Global excl China for data reasons)Severely adverseBaselinePositiveAdverseContentsUS:Checking in on millennials16Mexico:What is core CPI saying about potential GDP?20Australian employment growth:Bellwethers under pressure22Global Economic Outlook Summary4Global Central Bank Watch6Nowcast of global growth7Selected recent research from J.P.Morgan Economics9The J.P.Morgan View:Markets10Data WatchesUnited States24Euro area30Japan34Canada36Mexico38Brazil40Argentina42Chile&Colombia44United Kingdom46Emerging Europe48South Africa&SSA52EMEA EM focus54Australia and New Zealand55China,Hong Kong,and Taiwan57Korea61ASEAN63India67Asia focus69Regional Data Calendars72Bruce Kasman(1-212)834-JPMorgan Chase Bank NADavid Hensley(1-212)834-JPMorgan Chase Bank NAJoseph Lupton(1-212)834-JPMorgan Chase Bank NA2Economic ResearchGlobal Data WatchMay 10,2019JPMorgan Chase Bank NABruce Kasman(1-212)834-David Hensley(1-212)834-Joseph Lupton(1-212)834-Our previous analysis of the US-China trade war suggested that the direct impact of the tariffs would be relatively modest given that the incidence of the“tax”of roughly$125bn(25%of roughly$500 of US imports from China annually)would be spread across the supply chain(from Chinese and other Asian producers,US importers,and US households).We also assumed significant policy support,particularly from China,would largely offset the indirect sentiment shock.On net,although our start-of-year outlook initially projected a full implementation of the tariffs,we had assumed the impact on GDP growth this year would be a small 0.1%-pt in the US and 0.3%-pt in China(see here and here).However,the past years performance shows how powerful the indirect effects might be.Even recognizing that a slide in business expecta-tions was underway,we underestimated the sharp slowdown in global capex that took hold in 2H18.The disruptive impact on Chinas supply chain was also a surprise.The key call is to assess the degree to which sentiment,spend-ing,and financial markets already reflect the realization ofbusiness sector fears of a more material trade war.The early signal from markets is that some reversal of the rally in equity and credit markets will be forthcoming and this will reduce the fuel available for growth.As sentiment continued to slide in recent months despite the easing in financial conditions,the assessment on this front is less clear.To gauge its importance for the global outlook we turn to our capex model(Figure 2).The slide in confidence over the past year has damped spend-ing by nearly 2%-pts.Our outlook projects a modest recovery in sentiment alongside moderate profit growth to hold capex growth to a lackluster 2%-3%this year.However,should con-fidence continue sliding at the same pace as over the past year,we could see zero global capex growth this yeara rare event outside recessions.China wings clipped by trade warOur assessment of the impact of the trade war earlier this year was tracking well in China.With negotiations pointing to a deal and continued robust policy support,we boosted our full-year GDP growth forecast to 6.5%(4Q/4Q).Although the Lunar New Year fog has limited our visibility,weve viewed the risks around this call as evenly balanced pending confir-mation in next weeks April activity reports.However,this weeks developments threaten the dtente.If the US enacts a new 25%tariff increase on all imports from China(i.e.,25%not only on the current$200bn but also on the remaining$300bn of US imports from China),we think this would reduce Chinese GDP growth by 0.3%-pt in 2019 and 0.5%-pt in 2020.In our view,the economic impact in 2019 will be modest,reflecting that:(1)the tariff hike will mainly be felt in 2H19 and spill over into 2020;and(2)given the prolonged trade talks and escalation in the tariff war in 2018,some of the negative impact already has taken place,which means additional negative impact will be smaller com-pared to our estimates last year.We think any prospective policy response is likely to be reactive and fine-tuned,rather than preemptive.Possible steps could include an accelerated rollout of fiscal subsidies to support consumption;further RRR cuts and credit easing;and a weaker CNY,with the year-end USD/CNY forecast now at 6.80 from 6.65 previous-ly.In addition,officials have pledged to retaliate against the US with higher tariffs on US imports.When the elephants fight,the grass suffersThe Asian supply chain underwent a significant shock late last year as fears about a US-China trade war reached a climax.Chinas intermediate goods imports plunged,mainly from its Asian neighbors,as companies rushed to fill orders and draw down inventories.Recent reports suggested this shock was unwinding as a trade deal appeared at hand.This weeks trade report showed Chinese imports rebounded in April to near their previous high.Correspondingly,weve seen gains in EMAX exports in March,along with consecutive gains in the regional output PMI,though the advance in IP has been less impressive while the global new orders PMI for capital goods took a step back in April(Figure 3).Moreover,this normali-zation likely will be upended if the US and China engage in a new round of tariff hikes.Moreover,the entire region is still coping with weak global capex demand,limiting its growth prospects.Vulnerable Japan could defer VAT hikeIn Japan the imperial succession and long,10-day Golden Week holiday have boosted household spending and tourism.However,the latest readings on the PMI and consumer confi-dence remain subdued,suggesting sluggish underlying growth.Moreover,the country is vulnerable to collateral damage from the renewed US-China trade dispute.In re-30-18-66183047495153555720132014201520162017201820192020DI,sa(thru Apr 19)Figure 3:EM Asia ex.-China exports and global capex orders PMI%3m3m,saar(thru Mar 19)Source:J.P.MorganEMAXexport valuesPMI-New orders(Capital goods)3Economic ResearchGlobal Data WatchMay 10,2019JPMorgan Chase Bank NABruce Kasman(1-212)834-David Hensley(1-212)834-Joseph Lupton(1-212)834-sponse to this weeks escalation,Japans equity prices fell and the JPY appreciated.Further deterioration would weigh on corporate sentiment.We dont expect Japans policymakers to react immediately.But if economic conditions continue to deteriorate,the government could decide to postpone the VAT hike(from 8%to 10%)scheduled for this Octoberas a sen-ior LDP official hinted this week.EU Parliament elections may doom PM MayThe European Parliament elections due to take place May 23-26 are important for two reasons.First,they will highlight the increase in support for populists since the last elections in 2014.Our analysis suggests that populist parties will win al-most 30%of the seats in this years elections,up from 22%in 2014.And second,it may be the final straw that ends UK prime minister Mays term in office.The UKs participation in the European Parliament elections is mainly important for its symbolism.Once the UK leaves the EU,the UKs mem-bers of the European Parliament will return home.Our analy-sis suggests the newly created Brexit Party,which advocates for a no-deal Brexit,will win 25 seats.We predict the Con-servative Party will get 10 seats,about half what they achieved in 2014.Many in the Conservative Party will view this as a reflection of the frustration that many citizens feel that the UK has not left the EU yet.If May then resigns,it will open up the door to a Conservative Party leadership elec-tion and a new prime minister.A mostly dovish tilt The shift to easier projected central bank policies this year provides an important cushion that is helping to offset linger-ing business sector concerns(Figure 4).This weeks escalation in the trade war will encourage central banks to maintain their accommodative stances wherever market pressures allow it.This week brought fresh action in EM Asia,where both BNM and BSP cut ahead of our expectations.In Malaysia,BNM tightening financial conditions along with ongoing trade ten-sions prompted the cut.In the Philippines,BSP also highlighted concerns over global growth while flagging the near-term im-pact of the budget delays on economic activity.With the BSP also nudging down its inflation forecast this year,we now look for two further rate cuts this year.In Thailand,with scant evi-dence of any regional export upswing,increasing uncertainty over the trade war,and a committee that appears to see less urgency to tighten,we are removing our call for hikes this year.New Zealands central bank also lowered rates 25bp this week.The Bank,having introduced an easing bias at the pre-vious meeting,was responding to growth and inflation devel-opments.Although we looked for the RBA to ease as well this week,officials left rates unchanged despite a particularly weak CPI report.The new governor delivered fairly vague guidance that officials are watching the labor market,though their forecasts show they only expect a very slight fall in un-employment.We continue to think economic performance will fall short of the RBAs forecast though we pushed back forecasted rate cuts to August and November.Although the central bank tide is running dovish,there are exceptions.One group includes those trying to slowly normal-ize policy from very easy settings against a backdrop of do-mestic strength.The Norges Bank and the Riksbank are two examples.Indeed,at this weeks meeting the Norges Bank signaled plans to hike another 25bp in June despite ongoing weakness in the Euro area and the renewed uncertainty around US-China trade.The other group includes a subset of EM coun-tries that are vulnerable to capital flight,including Turkey,Mexico,and South Africa,among others.This week the CBRT responded to the latest lira weakness by tightening lira liquidity.With domestic political uncertainty likely to linger,and a deep-er contraction in growth expected this year,we push back our call for the CBRT to begin cutting from July to September,and we now see a total of 250bp in cuts(previously 400bp).Financial stability and inflation concerns also remain promi-nent in Mexico.At next weeks meeting,Banxico is likely to remain on hold with rates at an elevated 8.25%.Inflation has risen above the target range on an upswing in core inflation,which remains stubbornly high.Brazils COPOM kept the SELIC rate at 6.5%this week with officials seeing balanced inflation risks as continued uncertainty over reforms is offset-ting mediocre activity data.Colombias BanRep,which stayed on hold late last week at 4.25%,is maintaining a more dovish bias notwithstanding inflation drifting up from the target midpoint and a domestic-demand-led widening of the current account deficit above 4%of GDP.We think it will be forced to tighten by September.Editor:Gabriel de Kock(1-212)622-6718 -100-80-60-40-200GlobalUSDM ex USEM ex ChinaSource:J.P.MorganBp;Current vs.Dec 2018 forecastFigure 4:Policy rate,2019 forecast revision 4Economic ResearchGlobal economic outlook sum-maryMay 10,2019JPMorgan Chase Bank NADavid Hensley(1-212)834-Carlton Strong(1-212)834-Joseph Lupton(1-212)834-Global economic outlook summary Real GDPReal GDPConsumer prices%over a year ago%over previous period,saar%over a year ago2018201920203Q184Q181Q192Q193Q194Q192Q184Q182Q194Q19United States2.9 2.6 1.8 3.4 2.2 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.2Canada1.81.21.72.00.40.51.02.22.32.32.02.02.0Latin America1.2 1.42.4 1.5 0.8 0.6 2.7 2.6 2.3 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.5Argentina-2.5-1.22.5-2.0-4.72.52.52.01.027.147.457.739.8Brazil1.1 1.5 2.5 2.2 0.5 0.4 2.8 3.0 2.4 3.3 4.1 4.6 3.7Chile4.03.33.00.65.30.55.04.04.5 2.22.41.92.6Colombia2.7 3.4 3.1 3.2 2.4 2.8 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.23.5Ecuador1.4-0.3-0.83.20.3-1.0-2.0-2.0-2.0-0.80.30.30.1Mexico2.0 1.5 1.7 2.4 1.0-0.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 4.6 4.8 4.43.7Peru4.03.93.6-2.010.41.04.53.04.00.92.12.62.4Uruguay2.0 1.0 1.0-0.4-0.5 1.0 1.5 2.5 1.0 7.3 8.0 8.0 7.8Venezuela-10.01.02.028250600000.Asia/Pacific4.84.54.53.64.64.14.95.23.92.01.91.71.6Japan0.8 0.2 0.6-2.4 1.9-1.0 1.0 2.5-3.5 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.2Australia2.82.12.71.10.72.62.42.53.02.11.81.51.9New Zealand2.8 2.6 2.6 1.2 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.4 1.5 1.9 1.41.4EM Asia6.05.75.75.35.65.46.06.05.82.32.21.91.9China6.6 6.4 6.2 6.0 6.1 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.2 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.6India7.17.27.46.86.75.16.87.57.74.82.62.93.8Ex China/India3.7 3.3 3.5 2.8 3.7 2.44.2 3.8 3.8