收稿日期:2022-05-27基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N2206004).作者简介:关志民(1957-),男,辽宁开原人,东北大学教授,博士生导师.第44卷第3期2023年3月东北大学学报(自然科学版)JournalofNortheasternUniversity(NaturalScience)Vol.44,No.3Mar.2023doi:10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2023.03.019考虑制造商失望规避的供应链碳减排与定价决策研究关志民,徐浩鑫,于天阳,董经洋(东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169)摘要:分别在垄断与双寡头竞争情形下,研究不同市场结构下的低碳供应链运营决策问题,考虑减排技术投资的不确定性会引起制造商的失望规避行为,在两种情形下构建相应的博弈模型,探讨供应链的最优减排技术投资水平与定价决策问题.研究表明:垄断情形下,均衡结果与失望规避系数负相关,与减排技术投资成本效率正相关;竞争情形下,无论是低碳制造商主导还是双方权力对等,均衡结果与失望规避系数负相关、与消费者单位旅行成本正相关,低碳制造商主导时的低碳产品零售价格高于权力对等时,低碳制造商主导时的减排技术投资水平小于双方权力对等时,低碳制造商的期望利润和效用与减排技术投资的成本系数负相关,而普通制造商恰恰相反.关键词:双寡头竞争;低碳供应链;减排有效性;失望规避;权力结构中图分类号:C934;F272文献标志码:A文章编号:1005-3026(2023)03-0447-10ResearchontheCarbonEmissionReductionandPricingDecisionsofSupplyChainsConsideringManufacturers’DisappointmentAversionGUANZhi-min,XUHao-xin,YUTian-yang,DONGJing-yang(SchoolofBusinessAdministration,NortheasternUniversity,Shenyang110169,China.Correspondingauthor:YUTian-yang,E-mail:dbdxyty@126.com)Abstract:Theoperationaldecision-makingoflow-carbonsupplychainswithdifferentmarketstructuresisstudiedundertheconditionsofmonopolyandduopolycompetition.Consideringthattheuncertaintyaboutinvestmentinemissionreductiontechnologyinnovationwillleadtodisappointmentaversionamongmanufacturers.Theconstructingcorrespondinggamemodelsareconstructedinbothcases,andtherelevantdecision-makingissuessuchastheinvestmentlevelinemissionreductiontechnologiesandpricingofthelow-carbonsupplychainsarediscussed.Theresultsshowthatinamonopolysituation,theinvestmentlevelinemiss...